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The plaintiff/respondent, Robert Eisenstaedt, pursuant 
to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits 
the following Brief. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). This case was 
poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 70-2-2(4). This is an appeal from a final Judgment on the 
Verdict and an Order denying Otis's Motion for a New Trial or 
Remittitur and Otis's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict or New Trial. The Judgment and Order are from the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding. The jury trial took 
place on July 17, 18, and 19, 1989. The Judgment on the Verdict 
was docketed on August 27, 1989. The Order denying Otis's post-
trial motions was entered on October 23, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in denying Otis Elevator's 
("Otis") Motion for New Trial based on excessive damages undei: 
Rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
1 
2. Did the trial court err in denying Otis's Motion 
for New Trial based on insufficiency of evidence of liability 
under Rule 59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
3. Is this a frivolous appeal? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
Rules 50, 59(a)(5), and 59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, these rules are reproduced in the Addendum 
to this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A- Nature of the Case. 
This personal injury claim was brought by Robert 
Eisenstaedt against Otis for injuries sustained by Eisenstaedt 
when the Otis elevator at the Sears store in downtown Salt Lake 
City closed on his elbows, pinning them against his wheelchair. 
Eisenstaedt claimed that Otis was liable for his injuries under 
four theories: 1) negligence; 2) breach of implied warranty of 
merchantability; 3) breach of implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose; and 4) strict products liability. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
The plaintiff initially filed his Complaint against 
Otis and Sears Roebuck Co. ("Sears"). Shortly before trial, the 
2 
plaintiff dismissed his claims against Sears without prejudice. 
The plaintiff went to trial against Otis on the four theories of 
liability listed above. A jury trial was held before Judge Frank 
G. Noel on July 17 , 18, and 19, 1989. The jury returned a 
verdict finding that Otis was not negligent, but that Otis was 
liable for Eisenstaedt's injuries based on 1) breach of implied 
warranty of merchantability; 2) breach of implied warranty of 
fitness for a particular purpose; and 3) strict products 
liability. The jury awarded Eisenstaedt $17,250 in special 
damages and $5,000 in general damages. 
After trial, the trial court denied Otis's Motion for 
New Trial or, in the alternative, for Remittitur on the damages 
issue and denied Otis's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict or, in the alternative, New Trial on the liability 
issues. Otis appeals the denial of those motions. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. On April 9, 1986, the Otis elevator at Sears in 
downtown Salt Lake closed on Eisenstaedt's elbows, pinning them 
against his wheelchair. (Trial Transcript, hereafter "Tr.," at 
30-32, 145). 
2. Eisenstaedt immediately complained of pain in his 
elbows. He and his wife reported the incident to Sears, 
explaining that the elevator doors closed too fast, pinned 
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Robert's elbows, and did not react when they came in contact with 
his elbows- (Tr. at 34, 345, 347). 
3. The next day, April 10, 1986, Eisenstaedt saw Dr. 
Stream at the Wendover Clinic because of pain in his elbows. 
Eisenstaedt saw Dr. Stream three times and was referred to Dr. 
Thoen in Salt Lake City for an EMG. (Tr. at 38, 39). 
4. On April 30, 1986, Dr. Thoen performed an EMG on 
Eisenstaedt which showed "mild left tardy ulnar palsy at the 
elbow". (Tr. at 98, Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 9). 
5. On April 30, 1986, Eisenstaedt saw Dr. John 
Provost. Dr. Provost noted elbow tenderness and put 
Eisenstaedt's left arm in a long arm cast. (Tr. at 93-95). The 
cast stayed on for three weeks. (Tr. at 96). 
6. On April 30, 1986, Dr. Provost gave Eisenstaedt 
the anti-inflammatory medication Clinoril. (Tr. at 43, 95). 
7. On the night of April 30, 1986, back home in 
Wendover, Eisenstaedt took the Clinoril and testified that he had 
an adverse reaction within an hour after taking the medication. 
(Tr. at 44). 
8. Eisenstaedt was sent by air ambulance bark t-o sr . 
Mark's Hospital. (Tr. at 45). Eisenstaedt later ieturne'1 *<* ''t . 
Maik's Hospital where tests w^ ?~e run on Eisenstaedtr s heat t . 
(Tr. at 46). 
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9- Eisenstaedt had received no treatment for heart 
problems before seeing Dr. Provost, (Tr. at 67). 
10. Eisenstaedt testified that his reaction to the 
Clinoril was chest pain, difficulty breathing and nausea. (Tr. 
at 44). 
11. Dr. Provost testified, based on heart testing done 
at St. Mark's and later doctor reports he reviewed, that 
Eisenstaedt had less than marginal cardiac function. (Tr. at 
279^280). 
12. Portions of the Physician's Desk Reference, 
acknowledged by Dr. Provost as being authoritatively used and 
relied upon by doctors when seeking information about 
prescription drugs, were admitted into evidence at trial. (Tr. 
at 247). 
13. These portions of the Physician's Desk Reference 
reported causal relationships between Clinoril and, among others, 
the following adverse reactions: nausea, chest pain and heart 
Cailure, especially in patients with marginal cardiac function. 
(Tr. at 247-248). 
14. Eisenstaedt incurred medical bills of $3,7 16.69 
for the ambulance, air flight and hospitalization associated with 
the Clinoril reaction. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 8, Tr. at 
368) . 
5 
15. From April 30
 f 1986 to December 12, 1986, Dr. 
Provost continued to treat Eisenstaedt for his left arm problems. 
Dr. Provost saw Eisenstaedt at least six times. (Tr. at 100-
107). During that time, Dr. Provost referred Eisenstaedt for 
four additional EMGs: three by Dr. Ron Duerksen and one by Dr. 
Walter Reichert. (Tr. at 109, 233, 292). 
16. The medical treatment rendered and recommended by 
Dr. Provost for Eisenstaedt was reasonable and necessary for the 
treatment and diagnosis of Eisenstaedt's injury. (Tr. at 246). 
17. From January 1987 to April 1987, Eisenstaedt went 
to muscle therapy with Dr. Fishman at the Wendover Clinic, at $54 
or $66 a visit. (Tr. at 51-53). 
18. The treatment received by Eisenstaedt from Dr. 
Fishman at the Wendover Clinic was consistent with Dr. Provost's 
recommendations. (Tr. at 246). 
19. Eisenstaedt incurred medical expenses of $2,160.35 
for the EMGs, Dr. Provost, Dr. Stream and the Wendover Clinic. 
(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 8, Tr. at 366). 
20. While Dr. Duerksen's EMGs showed some difference 
in amplitude of the left ulnar nerve, he considered the EMGs 
within normal limits. (Tr. at 105, 316, 319, 322). Dr. 
Reichert's EMG was "compatible with ^ mild left ulnar compression 
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in cubital tunnel". (Tr. at 109-110, Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 
9)-
21. At trial, Dr. Duerksen and Dr. Reichert testified 
that an EMG is designed only to evaluate nerve damage. Even with 
a "normal" EMG, a person may sustain injury to the soft tissue, 
ligaments and tendons of the arm and experience pain. (Tr. at 
235, 321-322, 328-329). 
22. Don Vernon, a physical therapist, performed 
detailed electronic strength tests on Eisenstaedt's arms. (Tr. 
at 122-125). According to Vernon, these tests showed a 
consistent and reliable significant loss in strength in 
Eisenstaedt's left arm as compared to his right arm. (Tr. at 
126-128) . 
23. Vernon testified that his strength test results, 
while measured differently, did not differ greatly from, nor were 
they inconsistent with, Dr. Provost's test results. (Tr. at 127-
128) . 
24. Vernon explained how the testing is designed to 
prevent voluntary manipulation of the results by the patient. 
(Tr. at 139). Based on the results, Vernon testified that 
Eisenstaedt gave maximum effort on the tests. (Tr. at 127). 
25. When discussing his injury with his doctors or 
during testing to evaluate his injury, Ei.senstaedt did not 
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exaggerate his symptoms and gave his best physical effort. (Tr. 
at 348-349). 
26. Since the accident, Eisenstaedt has experienced 
continuous and significant weakness in his left arm. He is 
unable to get around with the aid of crutches as he did before 
the accident. (Tr. at 149). He is confined to his electrical 
cart most of the time. (Tr. at 149). He had had pain in his 
arm continuously since the accident to the date of trial. (Tr. 
at 58). Before April 9, 1986, Eisenstaedt had never seen a 
doctor or received any treatment for pain, numbness or weakness 
in his arms or hands. (Tr. at 48, 68). 
27. At the time of his injury, Eisenstaedt was working 
as the bookkeeper for Deseret Gas and Oil in Wendover, Nevada. 
(Tr. at 41). He worked full-time, making $5.60 an hour. (Tr. at 
41). 
28. Eisenstaedt tried to go back to work after the 
accident, but had trouble because of the long arm cast and the 
weakness in his arm. (Tr. at 42). 
29. On May 12, 1986, Eisenstaedt was terminated from 
Deseret Gas and Oil because he could not do his work with the 
long-arm cast and because he was confined to his wheelchair. 
(Tr. at 58). 
8 
30. In 1988, Eisenstaedt tried to return to work 
operating a computer for Frontier Enterprises. (Tr. at 58-59). 
He could not do it. (Tr. at 59). 
31. Other than that brief attempt to work at Frontier 
Enterprises, Eisenstaedt had been unable to work from May 12, 
1986 to the date of trial. (Tr. at 58-59). 
32. Dr. Provost testified that as of Provost's report 
of November 27, 1986, over seven months after the accident, 
Eisenstaedt was not able to return to work. (Tr. at 245). 
33. At the time of his injury, Eisenstaedt and his 
wife were living in a two bedroom mobile home. (Tr. at 60). 
34. The Eisenstaedts lived in a trailer court reserved 
exclusively for employees of the Stateline Hotel and Casino. 
(Tr. at 60). Deseret Gas and Oil was a subsidiary of the State 
Line. (Tr. at 60). 
35. As part of the rental agreement, the Eisenstaedts 
were forced to move out of the trailer court after Eisenstaedt 
was terminated on May 12, 1986. (Tr. at 60). 
36. Thereafter, the Eisenstaedts were forced to sell 
their trailer home. (Tr. at 60). 
37. Eisenstaedt testified that t. he trailer Imm*.' 'MS! 
between $34,000 to $35,000. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
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puts the purchase price, with improvement costs testified to, at 
over $32,500. (Tr. at 61, Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 4 and 5). 
38. Eisenstaedt eventually sold the trailer home, 
under pressure, for approximately $26,000. (Tr. at 62). 
39. Otis manufactured the elevator which injured the 
plaintiff. (Tr. at 159). 
40. Otis installed and sold that elevator to Sears in 
November, 1984. (Tr. at 159-161). 
41. On March 1, 1985, Otis entered into a maintenance 
and service contract wjth Sears, under which Otis provided 
exclusive maintenance and repair service for that elevator. (Tr. 
at 161). The maintenance and service contract was in effect on 
April 9, 1986, when the plaintiff was injured. (Tr. at 161). 
42. No company other than Otis serviced the elevator 
between the time it was installed and April 9, 1986. (Tr. at 
164) . 
43. The maintenance and service records on the 
elevator show that no substantial changes or alterations were 
made in the elevator from the date of its installation until the 
date of the plaintiff's injury. (Tr. at 195-197). 
44. Any substantial changes, alt-orations <M~ repaid <*t 
the elevator, from the date of installation to the date of the 
plaintiff's injury, would have been made by Otis. (Tr. at 197). 
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45* At the time of the accident, the elevator had a 
"dwell time" of 8.6 seconds. (Tr. at 187-189). This means that 
once the elevator doors open, they should remain open for 8.6 
seconds before they begin closing. (Tr. at 180, 188). 
46. Charles Schott, Otis's maintenance supervisor, 
testified that this is a very long dwell time compared to other 
elevators, the average dwell time of which is two or three 
seconds. (Tr. at 180). This was consistent with Schott's 
understanding that this elevator was restricted to accommodate 
handicapped individuals. (Tr. at 185). 
47. The ordinary purpose of an elevator is to safely 
transport passengers form one floor of a building to another. 
(Tr. at 173). 
48. At the time of the accident, despite the 8.6 
second dwell time, the elevator doors closed almost immediately, 
Eisenstaedt testified two or three seconds, after they had 
opened. (Tr. at 31, 145, 345). 
49. Schott testified that such an occurrence would be 
a malfunction of the elevator. (Tr. at 190-191): 
Q: If an elevator door closes in less 
than what the adius ted dwell time 
for that mechanism is, would you 
consider that a malfunction? 
A: That could be a malfunction. 
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Q: In your opinion, would that be a 
malfunction? 
A: I believe it would be, yes, sir. 
50. At the time of the accident, the elevator was 
equipped with a balance bridge detection device (Tr. at 167). 
Essentially, this is a reactive field extending two to four 
inches out from the edge of both elevator doors, running from the 
bottom of the elevator doors to approximately a foot- and one-half 
from the top. (Tr. at 169). 
51. The balance bridge is designed to automatically 
reverse the closing cycle of the elevator doors and open the 
doors when any object interrupts the field by coming within two 
to four inches of either door. (Tr. at 169-170). 
52. At the time of Eisenstaedt's injury, the elevator 
doors did not open when they came in contact with Eisenstaedt, 
but continued closing on his elbows until his wife pushed the 
button on the side of the elevator. (Tr. at 32, 33, 145, 345). 
53. Schott testified that such an occurrence would be 
a malfunction of the elevator. (Tr. at 171-172): 
Q: You'J 1 agree , won't you, Mr. 
Schott, that if that elevator door 
closes on ? passenger, cunes in 
contact with Hint passenger nnrl 
does not oppn until that button is 
pushed, that would rppresent a 
malfunction in that device? 
A: I would have to agree. 
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Q: Let's put these facts out to you, 
all right? While I believe there 
have been some small discrepancies 
in some of the testimony, I believe 
it's pretty consistent that the 
elevator doors closed on Mr. 
Eisenstaedt and came in contact 
with his elbows. And she [sic] 
did not react until she hit the 
button, and at that time it 
reversed. And for a period of 
time, those elevator doors were 
closed on Mr. Eisenstaedt's 
elbows. 
Based on that testimony, and if 
that is what happened, according to 
their testimony, would that 
represent a malfunction in the 
elevator on that- day? 
A: If that did indeed, happen, that 
would represent a malfunction. 
54. David Joseph, an Otis repairman, testified that 
there are times when a customer makes a complaint about an 
elevator door, Joseph goes out to check the elevator door, and it 
functions properly. (Tr. at 333). 
55. Malfunctioning of the elevator is not the 
intended result of Otis as the elevator manufacturer. (Tr. at 
172) . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The evidence at trial fully supported the damages 
verdict. A jury verdict should stand unless it is so excessive 
as to be shocking to one's conscience and to clearly indicate 
passion, prejudice, or corruption. Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 
300, 305 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). The trial testimony of the 
Eisenstaedts and Robert's doctors and therapists established 
medical expenses of between $2,160 and over $5,800; lost wages 
from $5,400 to over $30,000; loss on the sale of Eisenstaedt' s 
mobile home of around $6,000; and general damages for continuous 
pain, loss of ability to walk with crutches and other general 
loss of enjoyment of life. The jury verdict of $17,250 in 
special damages and $5,000 in general damages was well within, 
and fully supported by, the evidence presented. 
Point II 
The evidence at trial fully supported the liability 
verdict. Breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and 
fitness for a particular purpose and strict products liability do 
not require evidence of negligence. These claims are l>as^ <l nn 
how the elevator functioned on April 9, 1986. The elevator 
malfunctioned. The malfunctions were supported by the unrebutte'l 
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eye-witness testimony of Robert and Carol Eisenstaedt and Robert 
Schott, Otis's maintenance supervisor. Schott testified that if 
the accident happened as witnessed by the Eisenstaedts, the 
elevator malfunctioned. The jury believed the Eisenstaedts. It 
is within the province of the jury to infer the existence of a 
defective condition from the circumstantial evidence presented by 
a malfunction alone. There is no requirement that an actual 
defect must be proven. Caldwell v. Fox, 231 N.W.2d 46 (Mich. 
1975). Whether a product is defective is a jury question. 
Jackson v. Harsco Corp., 653 P.2d 407, 409 (Colo. Ct.App. 1982). 
Whether implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a 
particular purpose are breached is a question of fact for the 
jury. Pacific Marine Schwabacher v. Hydraswift Corp., 525 P.2d 
615 (Utah 1974). The liability verdict is supported by competent 
evidence and should not be disturbed on appeal. Mel Hardman 
Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 (Utah 1979). 
Point III 
This is a frivolous appeal by Otis. Rule 33(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides for an award of single 
or double costs, pLus attornpy fees, fou n frivolous app^oI A 
frivolous appeal is one without reasonable legal or factual 
basts. Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2H 1157 
(Utah Ct.App. 1980). It is an appeal with no reasonable 
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likelihood of success, which results in the delay of a proper 
judgment, Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
That's what this appeal is- These liability and damages issues 
are pure jury questions. No legal issues are raised on appeal. 
The trial court's denials of Otis's motions for directed verdict, 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and new trial, coupJed with 
the strict standard of review on these factual questions, make 
this a frivolous appeal. Otis has no reasonable likelihood of 
success and this appeal delays a proper judgment. Double costs 
and attorney fees are appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL FULLY 
SUPPORTED THE DAMAGES VERDICT 
Otis's first issue on appeal is that the trial court 
improperly denied a new trial because the damages awarded to the 
plaintiff were excessive and given under the influence of passion 
or prejudice and/or insufficiency of evidence to justify the 
damages verdict. The appellate standard of review is important. 
In Bennion v. Leqrand Johnson Construction Co., 7 01 
P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court explained the 
standard of appellate review of a trial court's denial of a 
motion of new trial based on excessive damages: 
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A reviewing court will defer to a jury's 
damage award unless the award indicates that 
the jury disregarded competent evidence 
(citations omitted); or that the award is so 
excessive beyond rational justification as to 
indicate the effect of improper factors in 
the determination (citations omitted); or 
that "it clearly appears that the award was 
rendered under [a] misunderstanding." 
(citation omitted). 
To justify a new trial for excessive damages 
under Rule 59(a)(5), Utah R.Civ.P., the 
damage award must be more than generous; it 
must be clearly excessive of any rational 
view of the evidence. (citations omitted). 
Id. at 1084. 
This Court recently stated: 
A jury verdict should stand unless it is "so 
excessive as to be shocking to one's 
conscience and to clearly indicate passion, 
prejudice, or corruption". 
Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300, 305, (Utah Ct.App. 1987). 
The $17,250 special damage amount awarded by the jury 
was not excessive and can be traced directly to the evidence 
presented at trial. There were approximately $2,160 in 
undisputed medical expenses. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 8, Tr. 
at 366). There were over $3,700 in disputed medical expenses, 
most concerning treatment for the Clinoril reaction. The 
plaintiff presented learned treatise evidence that those bills 
were causally related to the Clinoril prescribed by Dr. Provost 
for injuries caused by the elevator. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 
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0, Tr. at 247, 248, 368). Eisenstaedt testified and presented 
documentary evidence supporting the loss of over $6,000 for 
having to sell his mobile home when his employment at Deseret Gas 
and Oil was terminated. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 4 and 5, 
Tr. at 60-61). The plaintiff and Dr. Provost testified to full-
time lost wages of $5*60 an hour for a minimum of seven months to 
a maximum of over 3 years. (Tr. at 41, 58-59, 245). That 
computes to minimum lost wages of over $5,400 and a maximum of 
over $30,000, depending on the testimony of Dr. Provost and/or 
Robert Eisenstaedt. (Tr. at 367). 
Based on that evidence, the $17,250 special damage 
verdict is reasonable and well within the evidence presented. 
Apparently, the jury awarded Eisenstaedt the full $5,860 in 
medical expenses; the $6,000 lost in the sale of the mobile home; 
and the minimum $5,400 lost wage figure. That would total 
$17,260, ten dollars off the jury's special damages verdict. 
As for the $5,000 general damage verdict, it's tough 
Cor Otis to ax'gue that such an amount js an exorbitant award 
flamed by the jury's excessive sympathy. In fact, when the jury 
first returned with its verdict, it awarded no general damages Lu 
Eisenstaedt. (Tr. at 395, R. 23?). At that time, eisenstaedt'^ 
counsel objected to that verdict under Rule 47(r) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and requested that the judge send Uvj 
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jury out to determine the appropriate amount of general damages. 
(Tr. at 395-96). After deliberating for approximately forty-five 
minutes, the jury returned with its $5f000 general damage 
verdict. (Tr. at 399, R. 232). There was no excessive sympathy 
for Eisenstaedt. 
Otis also claims that the medical evidence was 
"uniformly against Mr. Eisenstaedt." (Appellant's Brief, p. 8). 
That is not what the jury heard. As specifically set out in the 
Statement of Facts section, with record references that will not 
be restated here, the jury heard the following: Eisenstaedt 
complained of pain immediately after the accident and sought 
treatment the next day. He treated with Dr. Stream and was 
referred to Dr. Thoen for an EMG. Dr. Thoen's EMG showed "mild 
left tardy ulnar palsy at the elbow." Eisenstaedt was referred 
to Dr. Provost. Dr. Provost explained the treatment he rendered 
to and recommended for Eisenstaedt, including placing him in a 
long arm cast for three weeks to immobilize the injured arm. The 
jury heard about the other EMG tests run by Dr. Duerksen and Dr. 
Reichert, all of which Dr. Provost testified were reasonable and 
necessary. Dr. Reichert's EMG was "compatible with mild left 
ulnar compression in the cubital tunnel." Dr. Provost and Don 
Vernon testified about the strength tests administered to 
Eisenstaedt. Vernon testified that his tests were not 
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inconsistent with Dr. Provost's, just measured differently, and 
that there was definite decrease in strength in Eisenstaedt's 
left arm. Eisenstaedt testified to his treatment and therapy 
with Dr. Stream and Dr. Fishman at the Wendover Clinic. Dr. 
Provost testified that treatment was consistent with his 
recommendations. The jury heard medical evidence about the 
causal relationship between Clinoril and the adverse reaction 
experienced by Eisenstaedt within one hour of taking that 
medication. Dr. Provost testified that Eisenstaedt was unable to 
work for at least seven months because of the injury. The jury 
heard Eisenstaedt and his wife testify to the pain and problems 
he has gone through since the injury. 
Eisenstaedt testified that before April 9, 1986, he had 
never seen a doctor or received treatment for pain, weakness or 
numbness in his arms or hands. (Tr. at 48, 68) . Otis could 
present no contrary evidence. Nevertheless, Otis argued at trial 
and argues on appeal that Eisenstaedt's medical problems were 
"tennis elbow" caused by continued use of crutches. Apparently, 
after forty-three years of using crutches, the tennis elbow "alL 
of the sudden" caught up with Eisenstaedt the same day as t h^ 
elevator accident. Eisenstaedt's counsel pointed u^t MK 1 
unreasonableness of that argument to the jury in closing 
argument. (Tr. at 388-389). The jury agreed. 
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Relying on Lisa Hurtado, the Sears security agent, to 
help establish Otis's damages defense reveals the weakness of 
that defense. Hurtado is not a doctor of any kind. (Tr. at 
344). Until trial, over three years after the accident, she had 
never seen or talked to Eisenstaedt. (Tr. at 344). She knew 
nothing about his medical condition or treatment since the 
accident. (Tr. at 344). She acknowledged that Eisenstaedt 
wanted to see his doctor. (Tr. at 345). 
After hearing all of that evidence, and any contrary 
evidence relied upon by Otis, the jury rendered its damages 
verdict in favor of Eisenstaedt. When the matter of damages is 
in dispute, it is an issue.upon which the parties are entitled to 
a jury trial, as on other disputed issues of fact. When a jury 
determines a question of fact, its verdict will not be disturbed 
if it is supported by any competent evidence. Mel Hardman 
Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 (Utah 1979). The 
decision reached by a jury acting as fact finder is to be 
accorded due deference by a reviewing court. Such deference 
necessarily extends to a jury's conclusion regarding damayes 
suffered by the plaintiff. Snyderville Transportation Co., Inc. 
v. Christiansen, 609 P.2d 939 (Utah 1980). This proposition was 
perhaps best explained by the Utah Supreme Court in EFCO 
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Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615 
(1966) : 
when the parties have had the 
opportunity of presenting their evidence and 
arguments concerning their dispute to the 
jury, the judgment of the jury should be 
allowed to swing through a wide arc within 
the limits of how reasonable minds might see 
the situation; and the Court should not upset 
a verdict merely because it may disagree. If 
it did so, the right of trial by jury would 
be effectively abrogated and the trial may as 
well be to the Court in the first place. 
The jury decided the damages issue based on competent 
and substantial evidence. The damages verdict was fair and it 
should stand. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL FULLY 
SUPPORTED THE LIABILITY VERDICT 
Otis's second issue on appeal is that the trial court 
erred in denying a new trial on the issues of strict products 
liability and breach of implied warranty based on insufficiency 
of evidence. The appellate standard of review for the denial of 
a motion for a new trial for insufficiency of evidence is 
different than that for the denial of a motion for a new trial 
based on excessive damages. The appropriate standard oJ review 
was explained by the Utah Supreme Court in Nelson v. TrujilJo, 
657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982): 
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Under Rule 59(a)(6) of the Utah R.Civ.P, a 
trial court may grant a new trial on the 
ground of "[iInsufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the verdict . . • . " . . • But when 
the issue is alleged insufficiency of 
evidence, the decisions of this Court have 
established a different standard for our 
review of the trial court's decisions on 
motions for new trial, depending on whether 
the court has denied or granted it. 
Where the trial court has denied the motion 
for new trial, its decision will be sustained 
on appeal if there was "an evidentiary basis 
for the jury's decision . . , . " The trial 
court's denial of a motion for a new trial 
will be reversed only if "the evidence to 
support the verdict was so compJetely lacking 
or so slight and unconvincing as to make the 
verdict plain]y unreasonable and unjust." 
(citations omitted). 
. . , This rule affords maximum latitude to 
the discretion of the trial court, which has 
heard testimony and other evidence presented 
to the jury and is best suited to evaluate 
the claim that it is insufficient to justify 
the verdict, (emphasis in original). 
^d. at 731-32, 
In his minute entry denying Otis's motions for new 
trial, Judge Noel concluded: 
It is not for the Court to weigh the 
evidence nor to substitute its judgment for 
that of the jury on factual issues. The 
Court is of the opinion that there was 
sufficient evidence on both the liability and 
damage issues upon which the jury could bas° 
its verdict. 
(R. 276). 
23 
Despite the standard of review and Judge Noel's ruling, 
Otis argues that there was insufficient evidence that the 
elevator was defective or unreasonably dangerous. Regarding 
breach of implied warranty, Otis claims that the elevator was 
designed and operated in accordance with the applicable codes and 
regulations and that there was no evidence of any failed 
inspection or code violation. 
Otis fails to recognize the most convincing evidence 
presented to the jury: Eye witness testimony of how the elevator 
functioned or, more appropriately, malfunctioned, on the day of 
the accident. Eisenstaedt' s and his wife's testimony about how 
the elevator closed immediately after opening and did not open 
once it hit his elbows, but continued to crush them against the 
wheelchair, was unrebutted. Otis's statement that the only 
evidence supporting verdicts on the breach of warranty and strict 
liability came from Eisenstaedt is wrong. Charles Schott, Otis's 
maintenance supervisor, when presented with the facts of the 
accident, testified that if that is how the elevator functioned, 
it malfunctioned. (Tr. at 171-172, 190-191). Schott testified 
as an expert. 
Strict products liability and breach of implied 
warranty theories do not require a showing of negligence. In 
fact, the jury found that Otis was not negligent in this case. 
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(Tr. at 393, R. 230). That shows that the jury understood the 
issues presented in the instructions. The elevator malfunctioned 
and hurt somebody. It was not fit for the ordinary purposes for 
which an elevator is intended. Schott acknowledged that purpose 
is to safely transport passengers from one level of the building 
to another. (Tr. at 173). The jury found that the elevator was 
not fit for that ordinary purpose- (Tr. at 394, R. 231). There 
was evidence that this elevator was specifically intended to 
transport handicapped persons, (Tr. at 185). The jury also 
found that it was not fit for that particular purpose. (Tr. at 
394, R. 231). The elements of strict products liability were 
established. Otis manufactured the elevator. (Tr, at 159). 
There was no substantial change in the elevator from the time of 
its installation to the date of the accident. (Tr. at 195-197). 
Otis took no exceptions to the jury instructions which were 
submitted regarding the strict products liability and implied 
warranty theories. (Tr. at 392-93). Verdicts should not be 
interfered with by an appellate court if the issues have been 
fairly submitted to the jury under proper instructions. 
Cartwright v. Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc., 593 P.2d 104 
(Okla. Ct.App. 1979) . 
Although Schottfs testimony established it, 
Eisenstaedt was not obligated to put on expert testimony showing 
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an actual defect in the elevator. Eisenstaedt and his wife 
testified about how the elevator functioned on the day of the 
accident. Otis's maintenance supervisor testified that such 
occurrences would be malfunctions in the elevator. Otis argues 
that David Joseph, a repairman, checked the elevator after the 
accident and it functioned properly. Joseph acknowledged, 
however, that he would receive complaints from customers about an 
elevator door malfunctioning, would go to check it, and it would 
function properly. (Tr. at 333). It is within the province of 
the jury to infer the existence of a defective condition from the 
circumstantial evidence presented by a malfunction alone. There 
is no requirement that an actual defect be proven. As stated by 
the Michigan Supreme Court in Caldwell v. Fox, 231 N.W.2d 46 
(Mich. 1975) : 
The testimony of Patrick Fox was evidence of 
a malfunction in the brake system which was a 
cause of the accident. It is within the 
province of the jury to infer the existence 
of a defective condition from circumstantial 
evidence alone; there is no requirement that 
the actual defect need be proven. (citation 
omitted). 
TA. at 51. See also, Sabloff v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., 113 N.J. 
Super. 279, 273 A.2d 606 (1971) ("whenever the fa^ts permit on 
inference that the harmful fvent ensued from some defect (whether 
identifiable or not) in the product, the issue of liability is 
for the jury"); Hastings MutuaJ Insurance Co. v. Croydon Hom^s 
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Corp. , 73 Mich- App. 699, 252 N.W.2d 558 (1977) ("In product 
liability cases, a product may be found defective from 
circumstantial evidence without a specific showing of a 
demonstrable defect . . . the defect may be inferred by the 
behavior of the product.1' ); Cartwright v. Atlas Chemical 
Industries, Inc- , 593 P.2d 104 (Okla. Ct.App. 1979); Ho linguist v. 
Volkswaqon of America, Inc., 261 N,W.2d 516 (1977), 
The jury was instructed that products are defective 
when they fail to perform in a manner reasonably to be expected 
by an ordinary consumer in light of their nature and intended 
function. (Jury Instruction No. 28f R. 217). Schott testified 
that malfunctioning of the elevator is not the intended result of 
Otis, the elevator manufacturer. (Tr. at 172). The jury was 
further instructed that a defect is "unreasonably dangerous" if 
it is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases or uses it, 
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to the 
product's characteristics. (Jury Instruction No. 28, R. 217). 
Otis took no exception to these jury instructions. (Tr. at 392-
93). 
Whether a product is de£e<*ti^e is a inuy quest jf>n 
Jackson v. Harsco, Corp., 653 P.2d 407, 409 (Colo. Ct.App. 1982). 
In this case the elements of strict products liability wei^ 
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established and properly submitted to the jury. The jury's 
verdict on that issue was supported by the evidence and should 
stand. 
The question of whether implied warranties of 
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose are breached 
is a question of fact for the jury. Pacific Marine Schwabacher 
v. Hydraswift, Corp., 525 P.2d 615 (Utah 1974). A finding of 
breach of implied warranty by the jury does not require a finding 
of negligence nor that the elevator was defective. It requires a 
finding by the jury that the elevator was not fit for the 
ordinary purposes for which it was intended and/or that it was 
not fit for the particular purpose for which it was intended. 
This jury was so instructed. (Jury Instruction No. 24f R. 213; 
Jury Instruction No. 25, R. 214). The jury found against Otis on 
both of those issues. (Tr. at 394, R. 231). Otis did not object 
to the jury instructions on implied warranty. (Tr. at 392-93). 
There was plenty of evidence for the jury to find, as 
it did, against Otis on the theories of strict products 
liability, breach of implied warranty of merchantability and 
breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 
For Eisenstaedt to recover his damages, it was only necessary 
for the jury to find against Otis on one of these theories. 
Under the evidence presented, the jury appropriately found 
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against Otis on all three. Because the issues of defect and 
breach of implied warranty are jury issues, the verdict will not 
be disturbed if supported by any competent evidence. Mel Hardman 
Productions, Inc. v Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 (Utah 1979); Hillier 
v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). The jury verdict 
on liability must, therefore, stand and judgment on the verdict 
be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THIS IS A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL 
Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides for an award of single or double costs, plus attorney 
fees, for a frivolous appeal. This Court has defined a frivolous 
appeal as one "with no reasonable likelihood of success, and 
which results in the delay of a proper judgment." Maugham v. 
Maugham, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) . It is an appeal 
without reasonable legal or factual basis. O'Brien v. Rush, 744 
P.2d 306 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). This is a frivolous appeal. 
In denying Otis's motions for directed verdict on 
liability issues, the trial court emphasized that those were fact 
issues for the jury. (Tr. at: 313). Stillr Otis moved f'\r new 
trials after the verdict. Again, in denying Otis's motions for 
new trial on damages and liability, the trial court indicated 
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that these were factual issues and that the liability and damages 
verdicts were supported by substantial evidence. (R. 276). 
Otis now appeals those rulings- This appeal is based 
entirely on factual issues properly determined by a jury. Otis 
makes no argument of legal error in the trial. Otis took no 
exceptions to jury instructions, made no objections to evidence 
improperly admitted, and made no argument of prejudice for 
refused voir dire questions. 
Otis just doesn't like the verdict and doesn't want to 
pay, so it appeals on fact issues. This appeal is particularly 
suspect because of the difficult standard of review Otis must 
overcome on these fact issues. Otis's task is insurmountable in 
light of the evidence marshalled by Eisenstaedt to support the 
verdict. 
Under all of these circumstances, this appeal is 
frivolous under Rule 33(a). The appeal has no reasonable 
likelihood of success and has already delayed a proper judgment 
for over one year. Eisenstaedt should be awarded double costs on 
appeal, plus attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION 
This case is what trials are about. Eisenstaedt and 
Otis disagreed on liability and damages. A jury decided thos^ 
liability and damages issues based on the evidence presented by 
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both parties* The damages verdict was fully supported and well 
within the evidence presented on special and general damages. 
The liability verdict showed that the jury understood the issues. 
They reviewed the maintenance history of the elevator and found 
that Otis was not negligent. The elevator, however, 
malfunctioned and hurt somebody. Otis's own maintenance 
supervisor acknowledged the malfunctions. The jury was properly 
instructed on breach of implied warranty and strict products 
liability. The jury found against Otis on each of those issues. 
The liability and damages verdicts were supported by the 
evidence. Otis lost fair and square at trial and simply doesn't 
want to pay. Eisenstaedt should be awarded double costs and 
attorney fees because this appeal is frivolous. 
The jury verdict and post-trial rulings of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
DATED this _jC*_Tday of August, 1990. 
ROBERT J. DEDRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Respondent 
JL^vJsi^ (A) 
GEORGE T(J WADDOUPS 
31 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT (Eisenstaedt v. Sears, et al) were 
mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid on the Qv r* day of August, 
1990, a to the following: 
Bruce R. Garner 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorney for Defendant Otis Elevator Company 
50 South Main Street, #700 
P. 0. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
2185-018 
^Jd<Ajr^sS\ . L\j &AM\ 
32 
ADDENDUM 
33 
